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THE THEORY OF MONEY SUPPLY: A CASE STUDY   
 
Leon Taylor 
     The theory of money supply is less developed than that of money demand, largely 
because 19th-century economists believed that money was unimportant and because they 
viewed the central bank as either an appendage to the economy or as a welfare-
maximizing black box.  The paper reviews each of these beliefs in turn. 
 
 
Did Money Matter to Early Theorists? 
Money-supply theory roots in the controversy over whether analysis should 
concentrate on quantities of products and inputs (the “real”) or on values measured in 
units of the national money (the “monetary”).  Is the value of a new car its opportunity 
cost measured in other goods, since the same resources that produced the automobile 
could instead have produced 20 computers?  Or is it $20,000?  John Maynard Keynes 
(1991: 32) attributed the historical dominance of Real Analysis to the victory, in the early 
19th century, of David Ricardo over Thomas Malthus concerning whether declines in 
aggregate demand precipitated economic slowdowns.  Like David Hume, Malthus had 
argued that output responds to demand and subsequently to money supply (O’Brien 2007: 
120).   “…Ricardo conquered England as completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered 
Spain,” Joseph Schumpeter (1994: 282) glumly observed, “…and the rest of the world.”  
Keynes (1963b: 117-8), in 1933:   
Malthus is dealing with the monetary economy in which we happen to 
live; Ricardo with the abstraction of a neutral money economy…One 
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cannot rise from a perusal of [their] correspondence without a feeling that 
the almost total obliteration of Malthus’s line of approach and the 
complete domination of Ricardo’s for a period of a hundred years has been 
a disaster to the progress of economics.  Time after time in these letters 
Malthus is talking plain sense, the force of which Ricardo with his head in 
the clouds wholly fails to comprehend. 
       
The debate over real and monetary analysis was manifest in the conflict of early 
19th-century England between the Currency School, which feared that excess money 
inflated prices and thus amplified the business cycle, and the Banking School, which 
maintained that banks merely satisfied the demand for money and were not necessarily 
responsible for the business cycle (Schwartz 1989: 47).  This controversy was 
precipitated by the British inflations of the Napoleonic era and by subsequent deflation 
(dated by Schumpeter (1994: 711) at 1815-1830 and beyond 1836).  It recurred in the 
United States (Miller 1924: 304-8), and in the following century, again in response to 
national inflations.           
The suspicion that money had real effects stimulated theory.  Early in the 19th 
century, “the study of the causes which govern the value of money was taken quite 
seriously,” wrote Alfred Marshall (2003: 79 and 90) in 1923, with Ricardo in mind.   
Men’s thoughts were then much occupied with the economic basis of 
political security as well as of general well-being….The violent 
disturbances of public credit and prices, which were caused by the 
devastations and the alarms of the Napoleonic wars, set a singularly able 
and well-informed group of students and men of affairs at work on the 
problem; and they left very little to be added as regards fundamentals by 
their successors.  
  
In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, economists were intrigued primarily by 
determinants of relative prices; determinants of the price level came second.  A side 
effect of this work may have been the dominance, in 19th-century monetary theory, of 
work determining the value of money (Schumpeter 1994: 701).  The purpose of money 
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was to provide a common measure for real values.  John Stuart Mill (2006: 506) 
elaborated.  “…The mere introduction of a particular mode of exchanging things for one 
another, by first exchanging a thing for money, and then exchanging the money for 
something else, makes no difference in the essential character of these transactions,” 
stated Principles of political economy, the economics textbook of choice in the mid-19th 
century.   
It is not with money that things are really purchased….There cannot…be 
intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than 
money; except in the character of a contrivance for sparing time and 
labor….Like many other kinds of machinery, it only exerts a distinct and 
independent influence of its own when it gets out of order.   
 
Money affected the national economy only in the rare episode of disequilibrium.   
In the eyes of late-19th-century theorists, money was vital to no market except its 
own.  Since the macroeconomy merely summed all markets, money did not play a 
substantial role in it.  In fact, money demand derived from consumption.  To buy a chair, 
the consumer must cash in some asset (Handa 2000: 33).  Total spending equals effective 
money demand (if people hold money only to spend it) and thus determines money 
supply.  “…In our days,” Knut Wicksell (1907: 215) wrote, “demand and supply of 
money have become about the same thing, the demand to a large extent creating its own 
supply.”  This was consistent with the microeconomic view that changes in demand 
would guide supply at first, since some inputs were fixed in the short run. 
In one analysis, consumers covered the rising prices of output by cashing their 
bank accounts.  Banks replenished their lost funds by purchasing money, albeit at higher 
prices for it than before.  Output prices therefore determined interest rates.  The latter 
could not serve as policy tools.  Neither, being another resultant, could money supply.   
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Keynes’s break with classical economists originated in his growing skepticism of 
the mainstream analysis which trivialized money.  When he began work on A treatise on 
money, published in 1930, he “was still moving along the traditional lines of regarding 
the influence of money as something so to speak separate from the general theory of 
supply and demand.  When I finished it, I had made some progress towards pushing 
monetary theory back to becoming a theory of output as a whole” (Keynes 1991: vi).   
Before then, Keynes too had belittled money.  More than a decade before The 
general theory, Keynes (2000: 152), then a monetarist, worried that the public would 
confuse nominal value for purchasing power. “It is not easy, it seems, for men to 
apprehend that their money is a mere intermediary, without significance in itself, which 
flows from one hand to another, is received and is dispensed, and disappears when its 
work is done from the sum of a nation’s wealth.”   
In 1923, Keynes (2000) had outlined a case for manipulating the money supply, 
through the central bank’s purchases and sales of securities, in order to stabilize domestic 
prices, as Irving Fisher (1912) had long proposed.  But in 1936, Keynes’s General theory 
adopted the then-conventional notion that monetary authorities would simply supply the 
amount demanded by people and government.  “This book…has evolved into what is 
primarily a study of the forces which determine changes in the scale of output and 
employment as a whole,” Keynes (1991: vii) wrote, “and, whilst it is found that money 
enters into the economic scheme in an essential and peculiar manner, technical monetary 
detail falls into the background.”     
The principle underpinning theoretical indifference to money was aggregation of 
decisions and markets.  Since money mattered little to individual decisions, it mattered 
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little to their sum.  Schumpeter (1989: 14) thought aggregation an error and illustrated 
with a metaphor.   
We may be interested in the processes of life going on in [a] dog, such as 
the circulation of the blood, its relation to the digestive mechanism, and so 
on.  But no matter how completely we master all their details, and 
however satisfactorily we succeed in linking them up with each other, this 
will not help us to describe or understand how such things as dogs have 
come to exist at all.  
  
By the mid-1930s, the rival view — that the macroeconomy exceeded the sum of 
its parts -- was becoming influential.   
I mean by [a general theory] that I am chiefly concerned with the behavior 
of the economic system as a whole,— with aggregate incomes, aggregate 
profits, aggregate output, aggregate employment, aggregate investment, 
aggregate saving rather than with the incomes, profits, output, 
employment, investment and saving of particular industries, firms or 
individuals,  
 
Keynes wrote in a 1939 preface to the French edition of The general theory of 
employment, interest and money. “And I argue that important mistakes have been made 
through extending to the system as a whole conclusions which have been correctly 
arrived at in respect of a part of it taken in isolation.”  For example, “the importance of 
money essentially flows from its being a link between the present and the future” — a 
point overlooked in static aggregate theory (Keynes 1991: 293; italics in the original).   
To neoclassical economists, this denial of simple aggregation arose from 
misapprehension of microeconomics.  “Keynes himself was not interested in the theory 
of relative prices,” remarked Joan Robinson (2006: 79).  “Gerald Shove used to say that 
Maynard had never spent the twenty minutes necessary to understand the theory of 
value.” 
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The assertion of money neutrality may seem to have, if nothing else, the virtue of 
clarity.  In reality, macroeconomists long remained ambivalent about money.  Adam 
Smith (1976: 309 and 313) regarded it as “the great instrument of commerce” but of 
peripheral interest because its value was nominal.  As late as 1911, Joseph Schumpeter 
echoed this disdain; money was a mere “cloak of economic things” (Schumpeter 1996: 
51).    But his Theory of economic development also said the money market “is always, as 
it were, the headquarters of the capitalist system, from which orders go out to its 
individual divisions, and that which is debated and decided there is always in essence the 
settlement of plans for further development” (Schumpeter 1996: 126).  Such ambivalence 
may have retarded development of the theory of money supply.   
In sum, even economists who thought that money was important labored more on 
the theory of money demand rather than on that of supply, perhaps partly because there 
was no developed theory of the latter for them to build upon.   
 
What Role Did the Central Bank Play? 
 
Assumption I: The bank was inessential 
The Banking and Currency Schools of the early 19th century had regarded the 
central bank as vital to the economy (Schwartz 1989: 47).  By the 1870s, however, 
economists were balking at the first step toward a theory of the central bank —  
explaining how it differed from a commercial bank.  “…The distinct teaching of our 
highest authorities has often been that no public duty of any kind is imposed on the 
Banking Department of the Bank [of England],” wrote Bagehot (undated: 81), “that, for 
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banking purposes, it is only a joint stock bank like any other bank; that its managers 
should look only to the interest of the proprietors and their dividend; that they are to 
manage as the London and Westminster Bank or the Union Bank manages.”  An 
economic historian affirms this perception.  “The Bank of England was to its directors 
just a large bank,” wrote John Wood (2009: 14) “with a special responsibility for 
financial stability because of its size (and they were not always conscientious in this 
regard, another reflection of bankers’ behavior) but none for such macroeconomic 
variables as the price level.” 
Without theory to guide them, central banks such as the Federal Reserve in the 
late 1910s issued money only if it seemed needed (Miller 1921).  This enabled the Fed to 
deny that it was responsible for inflation.  Rising wages and prices led to an increase in 
money, not the other way around (Reed 1921: 64-5).  In 1915, the president of England’s 
Board of Trade vouchsafed that “the line of escape from rising prices must be found in 
raising wages...” (Keynes 1950b: 171).  Even the president of the Reichsbank, despite the 
hyperinflation of 1923, seemed to deny that creating money would lessen the value of a 
monetary unit (Cannan 1924: 54). 
In 1924, Sir Harry Goschen, chairman of a major British bank, National 
Provincial Banks, told the public that “I cannot help thinking that there has been lately far 
too much irresponsible discussion as to the comparative advantages of Inflation and 
Deflation.  Discussions of this kind can only breed suspicion in the minds of our 
neighbors as to whether we shall adopt either of these courses, and if so, which.  I think 
we had better let things take their natural course.”  Keynes (1963a: 222) commented: 
“Best of all, perhaps, just to leave Sir Harry to take his natural course.”   
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As late as the early 1920s, the notion that the central bank could stabilize the 
economy through monetary policy was still almost novel.  The aim of the central bank 
was just to obtain enough gold to enable trade (Schumpeter 1994: 729-31) and to buy 
government debt.  The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 called upon the central bank to set 
policy “with a view of accommodating commerce and business” (Federal Reserve Act, 
Section 14, Paragraph D; quoted in Miller 1921: 186).  The emergence in the U.S. of 
inflation that had been suppressed during World War I “required” new dollars – a view 
that the Federal Reserve would reject only eventually.  “It is only over the last 60 years,” 
Hayek (1999a: 252) wrote in 1981, “that money has come to be regarded as one of the 
prime instruments of economic policy in general and a useful way by which political 
authority could contribute to prosperity.” 
A central bank may have been a passive policymaker partly because it observed a 
device by which commercial banks regulated their own creation of money — the share of 
deposits that they locked up in vaults.  Money supply depended partly and inversely on 
this reserves ratio, said Keynes.  Remarkably, banks in various settings tended toward the 
same ratio, he noted.  His colleague at Cambridge, Arthur Cecil Pigou, had thought that 
the ratio would depend on activity of the national economy, but Keynes (1950b: 53-78) 
calculated in 1930 that banks throughout the West, in large economies as well as small, 
had stabilized this share at roughly a tenth. (Sixty years earlier, the ratio of cash to 
liabilities in Western national banks of the early 1870s varied from 11% to 12% in 
England and the United States to 47% in France (Bagehot undated: 168-70).)  Adopting 
the reserves ratio of leading private banks could serve as a bank’s public signal of 
stability.  This point could be subsumed under the argument of the Free Banking School 
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for competition among private banks in issuing currency convertible into specie.  Since 
the depositor would accept the notes only of credible banks, these had an incentive not to 
over-issue (Schwartz 1989).  
Passive adoption of the standard reserve ratio was common even in countries such 
as Britain where the central bank could have required commercial banks to set aside 
minimum reserves but did not.  Keynes (1950b: 70-4) criticized this failure.  So did 
Bagehot (undated: 159).  The ratio should depend on the need to demonstrate to the 
public that the Bank had sufficient reserves to ward off a panic.  “The forces of the 
enemy being variable, those of the defense cannot always be the same,” wrote Bagehot in 
1873.  In fact, the forces of the defense varied naturally.  “Liabilities may be imminent or 
distant, and a fixed rule which imposes the same reserve on both will sometimes err by 
excess and sometimes by defect” (page 167).  Moreover, when the public knew that the 
reserve ratio had been fixed at, say, one-third, “the moment the banks were close to one-
third, alarm would begin and would run like magic” (page 167).  Despite these flaws of a 
fixed reserve ratio, Bagehot conceded that abandoning the rule would amount to “almost 
a revolution in the policy of the Bank of England” (page 159).  
Part of the problem was a lack of Bank theory.  “…If it were acknowledged that 
the Bank is charged with the sole custody of our banking reserve, and is bound to deal 
with it according to admitted principles, then a governor of the Bank could look to those 
principles” (Bagehot undated: 36).  First and foremost, the Bank should maintain a 
reserve that was large enough to persuade the public that it could meet any sudden 
demand for liquidity.  If anything, it should err on the side of caution by maintaining 
excessive reserves, since the only ensuing loss would be foregone interest (Bagehot 
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undated: 161).  But this is exactly the loss that most concerned Bank directors, being 
merchants facing no evident penalty for inducing a panic.  “The Bank of England…has to 
keep [the reserve] through all changes of the money market, and all turns of the 
Exchanges; has to decide on the instant in a panic what sort of advances should be made, 
to what amounts, and for what dates; and yet it has a constitution plainly defective” 
(Bagehot undated: 109).  
Not all economists were persuaded.  Schumpeter (1994: 697) wrote cryptically in 
the mid-20th century that “there is more to the old theory that a central bank serves the 
economy best if it attends to its own profit interest than we are at present willing to 
admit.”              
Perhaps the central bank sold money cheaply to powerful clients.  “The Federal 
Reserve Board adopted a policy in order to assist in the war financing which was 
economically unsound,” the Board’s governor admitted to Congressional committees in 
1920 (Miller 1921: 185-6).  To reduce the cost of financing World War I, the Fed lent 
cheaply to commercial banks, which then lent to the Treasury.  “The low rate of interest 
borne by these [Treasury] bonds was fixed with a view of holding down the expenses of 
the government as far as possible.  Anyway, that is something the Federal Reserve Board 
has no responsibility for.” 
The importance of policy to theory sometimes threatened to convert the latter into 
a popularity contest, asserted economists who were likely losers.  People “persistently 
disregarded” Austrian proposals because they “hurt in the application,” commented 
Hayek (1995: 233) in 1945.  “Then Lord Keynes assured us that we had all been 
mistaken and that the cure could be painless and even pleasant” — just keep spending 
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until reaching full employment.  “The argument was not less effective because it was 
couched in highly technical language.  It gave the support of the highest scientific 
authority to what had always been the popular belief, and the new view gained ground 
rapidly.” 
Just as he had criticized Smith, Schumpeter (1936: 791-2) complained that The 
general theory was policy advocacy in search of a theory.  Keynes  
pleads for a definite policy [government spending in downturns], and on 
every page the ghost of that policy looks over the shoulder of the analyst, 
frames his assumptions, guides his pen.  In this sense, as in another, it is 
Ricardo all over again….It is…vital to renounce communion with any 
attempt to revive the Ricardian practice of offering, in the garb of general 
scientific truth, advice which — whether good or bad — carries meaning 
only with references to the practical exigencies of the unique historical 
situation of a given time and country.  This sublimates practical issues into 
scientific ones, divides economists — as in fact we can see already from 
any discussion about this book — according to lines of political 
preference, produces popular successes at the moment, and reactions after 
— witness the fate of Ricardian economics — neither of which have 
anything to do with science.  Economics will never have nor merit any 
authority until that unholy alliance is dissolved.     
 
Danger inhered in the charter of a conventional central bank.  It has “the 
recognized duty…to supply in an emergency — at a price — all that cash that may be 
needed to repay [commercial bank] deposits,” wrote Hayek (1999c: 89) in 1937.  (To put 
the point in another way, the central bank should maintain a discount rate that was no 
higher, and normally equal to, the market rate of interest.)   “Yet while the ultimate 
responsibility to provide the cash when needed is thus placed on the central bank, until 
this demand actually arises, the latter has little power to prevent the expansion leading to 
an increased demand for cash.”  The theory of passive money supply held the gun-cotton 
of the economy’s destruction. 
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Assumption II: The bank was a black box 
The absence of a political theory of money supply may have stemmed from the 
confidence of economists that the central bank — and the state in general — was 
dedicated to the public weal.  Events belied the argument in 1840 of an American 
economist, Thomas R. Dew, that banks should control money supply because they had 
superior knowledge of financial conditions (Miller 1924: 306-7).  Nevertheless, almost a 
century later, Keynes returned to Dew’s view.  One creator of the Federal Reserve, 
Senator Carter Glass, described it as “an altruistic institution, a part of the Government 
itself, representing the American people, with powers such as no man would dare 
misuse” (Wood 2009: viii).    
Some economists thought that central bank officials advanced the social welfare 
out of self-interest.  Keynes’s old teacher, Alfred Marshall (2003: 136-7), had written in 
1923 that while the directors of the Bank of England included “many leading business 
men…it has been stated publicly that, as a general rule, their stakes in the Bank itself are 
so much less than their stakes in the general commercial prosperity of the country, that 
they cannot be tempted to sacrifice public interests to those of the shareholders of the 
Bank….They act with that full sense of responsibility which belongs to public ministers.”  
Marshall was echoing Henry Thornton’s view that “the numerous proprietors who choose 
the directors, and have the power of controlling them…are men whose general stake in 
the country far exceeds that particular one which they have in the stock of the company” 
(Wood 2009: 25).  The appendix to this paper suggests that it is improbable that a Bank 
of England director would have benefited on net by increasing Bank reserves in order to 
stabilize the economy.   
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Keynes (1950b: 163) generalized the Hamiltonian view.  “Perhaps the ultimate 
solution lies in the rate of capital development becoming more largely an affair of state, 
determined by collective wisdom and long views,” he wrote in 1930, in A treatise on 
money.   
If the task of accumulation comes to depend somewhat less on individual 
caprice, so as to be no longer at the mercy of calculations partly based on 
the expectation of life of the particular mortal men who are alive today, 
the dilemma between Thrift and Profit as the means of securing the most 
desirable rate of growth for the community’s aggregate wealth will cease 
to present itself.   
 
Keynes may have been on shaky ground to assume that the price at which capital 
can be resold never reflects its expected present value beyond the life of its current 
owner.  The prospective purchaser may anticipate reselling the asset decades later and so 
would consider now, as he estimates the highest price that he would pay for it, its value to 
the next generation.  But what would infuriate future critics like Milton Friedman (1997: 
22) was Keynes’ cool presumption that state officials would come closer to investing in 
real capital at the optimal rate than could the invisible hand.  As early as 1766, the public 
finance theorist Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1948: 385) had pointed out that 
monarchs were self-interested and so had to be compelled to raise money from their 
crown estates first rather than from the populace.  In this respect, a monetary policymaker 
has the same temptations as a fiscal one:  An expansionary policy transfers wealth from a 
future generation to the present one via the inflation tax, since people rarely recognize 
inflation immediately.  More practically, a Hayekian could argue that no government (or 
individual) could determine the variable that was critical to investment — the 
Wicksellian natural rate of interest, which cleared the market for real loanable goods 
(Hayek 1999d: 81; Hayek 1999b: 225) — because it was unobservable.   
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The younger Keynes (1914a: 622) had regarded most central banks — the Bank 
of England was a decided exception — as hilariously irrational, thus mirroring the 
populace: 
  …In most other parts of the world…a gold reserve is thought of 
as being some sort of charm, the presence of which is valuable quite apart 
from there being any idea of dissipating it, — as the emblem, rather than 
the prop, of respectability.  It would be consistent with these ideas to melt 
the reserve into a great golden image of the Chief Cashier and place it on a 
monument so high that it could never be got down again.  If any doubt 
comes to be felt about the financial stability of the country, a glance 
upwards at the image will, it is thought, restore confidence.  If confidence 
is not restored, this only shows that the image is not big enough.   
 
Even a war fund such as Germany’s in World War I often went by the board.  “Although 
many countries now hold large quantities of gold, there are but few which pursue a 
rational policy in regard to it.  At considerable cost they build up large reserves in quiet 
times presumably with a view to the next crisis; but when the crisis comes mistaken 
policy renders them as little able to use the gold as if it were not there at all” (Keynes 
1914b: 467).   
It is not clear why Keynes abandoned these strong views.  Schumpeter (1946: 
506) complained that The general theory failed to take banks seriously.  “…From first to 
last, Keynes displayed a curious reluctance to recognize a very simple and obvious fact 
and to express it by the no less simple and obvious phrase, that typically industry is 
financed by banks.”       
Keynes’ sunny new view of central bankers ignored David Hume’s cynicism.  “A 
great state,” Hume (1948: 334) wrote in 1752, “would dissipate its wealth in dangerous 
and ill-concerted projects; and probably destroy, with it, what is much more valuable, the 
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industry, morals and numbers of the people.”  Keynes also ignored Adam Smith’s 
argument in 1776 that altruism may mislead the leader into disaster.  
The statesman, who should attempt to direct people in whatever manner 
they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a 
most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be 
trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, 
and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who 
had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it (Smith 
1976: 478).   
 
Skeptical theorists of the money supply had long recognized its political flavor.  
“Some [writers], regarding banks as the principal cause of commercial crises, conceived 
of them as arbitrarily alternating the volume of media of payment (and therefore the 
general level of prices) according to their own caprice,” wrote an historian of American 
economic thought, Harry Miller (1924: 308).  “Such a notion was especially prominent in 
the earliest days of our banking experience, and again in the 1830s, when to damn banks 
or defend them became largely a matter of political faith.”  But such skeptics were few.   
 
Conclusions 
The theory of money supply might have progressed had economists picked up on 
early glimmerings such as Bagehot’s reflections on the political economy of central-bank 
directors.  This is not the first time that economists have failed to build upon keystones of 
the past.  “The Englishmen who started writing on monetary policy around 1800 knew 
very little about the English work of the seventeenth and even the eighteenth centuries,” 
wrote Schumpeter (1994: 706), “and still less, almost nothing in fact, of the non-English 
work of those centuries — an interesting example of how the advance of economics has 
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been and is being impaired by these recurrent losses of previous accumulations of 
knowledge.”  
 
Appendix:  The Impact of Bank Reserves on the Director’s Portfolio 
 
Denote Y as national income, R as central bank reserves, A as central bank assets, 
r1 as the nationwide rate of interest, r2 as the rate of interest on central bank assets, s1 as 
the director’s share of national income, and s2 as his share of returns earned by the central 
bank.  Then the value of his portfolio, which is based on national and bank income, is 
 
).()( 2211 RArsRYrsV −+=    
 
The formula assumes that national income depends positively on bank reserves because 
higher reserves help stabilize the economy. 
 
In effect, Marshall assumes that dV/dR > 0.  This implies that 
 
Equation 1 
2211 rsR
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If r1 = r2, then Equation 1 simplifies to 
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Equation 2 
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Out of self-interest, the bank director will support increasing bank reserves by one pound 
if the resulting increase in national income exceeds the ratio of his share of bank returns 
to his share of national returns. 
Here’s a back-of-the-envelope estimate.  In 1921, the population of the United 
Kingdom was 44.1 million; of England and Wales, 37.9 million (House of Commons 
1999: 6).  Today, the Bank has nine non-executive directors as well as three governors 
(Bank of England 2012).  Suppose that a director’s general income is as much as 10 times 
the average income and that he receives as little as one-thousandth of the returns earned 
by the Bank.  Then, from Equation 2, Bank policy to stabilize the national economy 
would serve the director’s self-interest if another pound in Bank reserves would increase 
national income by about 3,800 pounds.  This multiplier seems improbably large. 
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